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ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO
PRIVACY WARRANTS GREATER
PROTECTION OF ALASKANS’
PERSONAL DATA
Eric Buchanan*
ABSTRACT
Alaska’s legislature should pass a comprehensive data privacy law to prevent
companies’ exploitation of citizens’ personal data. The Alaska Constitution
explicitly provides Alaskans with the right to privacy and calls upon the
legislature to protect that right. Despite this explicit right, Alaskans’ privacy
rights are vulnerable to exploitation by private companies. Proposed legislation
to address this vulnerability should ensure data privacy protection, but the
legislature should remain cognizant of concerns regarding innovation and
business. To best achieve this balance, the legislation should be founded in
generally accepted data privacy principles and should establish strong financial
penalties for companies that violate the law. The legislation should also be
flexible enough to avoid stifling innovation and unreasonably increasing
compliance costs. More specifically, the law should allow companies to provide
financial incentives to consumers in exchange for permission to collect, use,
and share their data. Privacy legislation that meets these goals will effectively
protect data privacy, while simultaneously enabling companies to innovate and
turn a profit.
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“[S]ome of the most prominent and successful companies have built
their businesses by lulling their customers into complacency about
their personal information. They’re gobbling up everything they can
learn about you and trying to monetize it. We think that’s wrong.”
– Tim Cook, Apple CEO1

I. INTRODUCTION
Personal data has become a lucrative commodity, generating billions
of dollars for the private companies that collect it.2 Data’s value is derived
from its versatility—it can be used to improve the customer experience,
refine marketing strategy, generate cash flow, drive business decisions,
promote product development, and even secure additional data.3 Datadriven innovation has revolutionized the way individuals interact with
the world, offering services that make everyday life more convenient.
However, “with prodigious potential, comes prodigious risk.”4
Today, private companies collect information regarding shopping
habits, religious affiliations, sexual preferences, and personal
relationships, as well as locational and sensitive health data.5 All this data,
with few sector-specific exceptions,6 can be used however the company
wishes.7 The lack of regulation is concerning: the sensitive nature of this
1. LEANDER KAHNEY, TIM COOK: THE GENIUS WHO TOOK APPLE TO THE NEXT
LEVEL 167 (2019).
2. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, EXPLODING DATA: RECLAIMING OUR CYBER SECURITY IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 77 (2018). To further understand the value of data, consider
another quote by Apple CEO Tim Cook: “Every day, billions of dollars change
hands and countless decisions are made on the basis of our likes and dislikes, our
friends and families, our relationships and conversations, our wishes and fears,
our hopes and dreams. These scraps of data, each one harmless enough on its
own, are carefully assembled, synthesized, traded and sold.” Tim Cook: Personal
Data Collection is Being ‘Weaponized Against Us with Military Efficiency,’ CNBC (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-warns-siliconvalley-it-would-be-destructive-to-block-strong-privacy-laws.html.
3. See generally Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses are Collecting Data (And
What They’re Doing With It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018), https://
www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html.
4. Zynep Tufekci, We’re Building a Dystopia Just to Make People Click on Ads,
TEDTALK (1:51) (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_
tufekci_we_re_building_a_dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads.
5. CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 73.
6. Entities that must comply with at least some privacy-specific regulations
are healthcare, banking, and credit reporting companies, and companies that
knowingly collect children’s data. See infra Section III.C.
7. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 3 TEX. L. REV. 85, 146 (2014)
(explaining how the FTC can pursue privacy violations when the company has
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data can result in the denial of medical insurance, unfavorable
employment decisions, discriminatory ad targeting, and other forms of
discrimination.8 Furthermore, a company that collects data during its
regular course of business can sell it to whichever commercial,
ideological, or political actor is willing to pay.9 Malicious actors can also
gather detailed intelligence on specific individuals and use that data to
undermine the integrity of elections, radicalize and recruit vulnerable
populations, and disseminate false information.10
A comprehensive privacy regime could safeguard citizens against
malicious uses of data by providing people with greater control over their
personal information and by encouraging companies to implement
internal consumer data protections. However, the United States’ current
federal privacy regime fails to adequately protect consumer data,11 and it
seems unlikely that Congress will pass comprehensive federal privacy
legislation any time in the near future.12 Therefore, legislation protecting
Alaska citizens from potential exploitation should come from Alaska’s
government.
The potential exploitation of Alaska resources is not a novel
problem. The trend of data exploitation, although not unique to Alaska,
is strikingly similar to the exploitation of natural resources that Alaska
has previously confronted. Alaska’s abundance of natural resources has
resulted in both economic booms and busts throughout its history.13
Outsiders have flocked to Alaska, seeking to profit from these valuable
resources only to leave once they have made their fortunes.14 These
economic booms contributed to Alaska’s growth. However, the economic

deceptive or misleading privacy policies).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 42 (describing the utility of data).
10. DONALD J. TRUMP, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 31–
35 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
11. See infra Section III.C.
12. This is largely because of the presidential impeachment hearing, the
looming 2020 elections, and Congress’s general inability to pass legislation. See
Trump Impeachment: A Very Simple Guide, BBC (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39945744 (summarizing the
Trump impeachment proceedings); see also Drew Desilver, A Productivity Scorecard
for the 115th Congress: More Laws Than Before, But Not More Substance, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/
01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress/ (noting that the current
Congress is one of the least productive in history).
13. See ERIC SANDBERG, ALASKA DEPT. LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., A HISTORY
OF ALASKA POPULATION SETTLEMENT 9−12, 15−16 (Sara Whitney ed., 2013)
(discussing the economic booms and busts resulting from gold and oil
discoveries).
14. Id.
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busts forced Alaskans to consider how to utilize resources to drive
economic growth while simultaneously preventing exploitation.15
In their effort to address this issue, Alaskans have made a conscious
effort to mitigate those risks. Alaska’s statehood movement was spurred
largely by concerns over control of Alaska’s natural resources.16 Many
pre-statehood residents traced the exploitation of Alaska’s resources “to
[the] sins of omission and commission by the federal government.”17 They
believed the only way that residents could regain control of fish and
wildlife, minerals, forests, and other resources was through statehood.18
Accordingly, the framers incorporated these basic objectives into the
Alaska Constitution by adding a section dedicated to the protection of
natural resources.19 And in the following decades, Alaska learned from
the experiences during pre-statehood and used its constitution as
inspiration to find solutions addressing new threats to the state’s natural
resources.20
Once again outsiders are exploiting Alaska’s resources and taking
the profits for themselves. Much like the exploitation in the past, this
recurrence can be attributed to “sins of omission and commission by the
federal government.”21 The lack of federal legislation protecting data
privacy on a national scale enables this exploitation. However, Alaska’s
government has the explicit authority to mitigate these risks and protect
15. GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 129–30 (5th ed.
2012), http://
w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf (discussing the legislative
history surrounding the inclusion of natural resource rights under the Alaska
Constitution).
16. GERALD A. MCBEATH & THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, ALASKA POLITICS &
GOVERNMENT 126 (1994).
17. Id.
18. See HARRISON, supra note 15, at 129−30 (explaining the legislative history
surrounding the passage of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution).
19. Id.; see also ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their
natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common
use.”); ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of
fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This
section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for
purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen
and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient
development of aquaculture in the State.”). The second part of section 15 was
added through a 1972 amendment to authorize an exception to the first sentence’s
prohibition, allowing the state to institute a limited entry program for distressed
fisheries. HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38.
20. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.010–46.03.045 (2018) (implementing
policies regarding environmental conservation); id. §§ 46.11.020–46.11.070
(implementing policies regarding conservation of energy and materials); id. §
46.35.300 (discussing the extension of resource extraction or removal related
permits).
21. See MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 16.
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Alaskans. Unlike the United States Constitution, the Alaska Constitution
expressly provides its citizens with the right to privacy.22 Despite this
explicit right, Alaska does not currently afford data privacy protection
above the minimum federal protection.23
The Alaska Supreme Court has relied on Alaska’s constitutional
right to privacy to protect Alaska citizens from privacy intrusions by the
government; however, it has refused to extend these protections to
violations perpetrated by private companies.24 Thus, in order to protect
its citizens from such violations, the Alaska legislature should pass
comprehensive privacy legislation. This law should borrow key aspects
from California’s and the European Union’s comprehensive privacy
regulations.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II will describe Alaska’s
explicit right to privacy and explain how Alaska’s interest in privacy has
hindered greater data protection. Part III will justify why the legislature
should pass comprehensive privacy legislation. It will specifically focus
on the harms associated with unregulated data usage, tort law’s inability
to adequately protect data privacy, the lack of federal comprehensive
privacy legislation, and the benefits that would be provided through
comprehensive data privacy legislation. Part IV will discuss how
American values generally and Alaskan values specifically change the
calculus of what should be included within the act. Finally, Part V will
explain key elements that the legislature should include within the bill,
borrowing various ideas from the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Protection
Act (CCPA).

II. ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE COURT’S
INABILITY TO SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT IT
This Section will proceed by first briefly explaining Alaska’s
longstanding tradition of protecting individuality and privacy.
Specifically, it will discuss Alaska’s explicit right to privacy and how the
court has interpreted the constitutional privacy protection with regard to
data privacy. It will also describe the limitations on the court’s powers
and explain why the legislature must be the branch to protect Alaska
citizens from data exploitation by private companies.

22. See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this
section.”).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Section II.B.
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A. Alaska’s Tradition of Respecting Privacy and Individuality
Alaska has a longstanding tradition of respecting privacy and
individuality.25 Many of Alaska’s early settlers were escaping various
forms of misfortune, trouble, and misconduct.26 Others simply found life
too constricting within developed cities and communities of the lower
forty-eight and sought refuge at the edge of the frontier.27 The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized this uniqueness, stating that:
[O]ur territory and now state has traditionally been the home of
people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to
settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of
control over their own lifestyles which is now virtually
unattainable in many of our sister states.28
These characteristics have evolved into Alaska’s general policy of
tolerance towards personal idiosyncrasy, unconventional lifestyle and
thought, and personal privacy.29
Demonstrating the importance of individuality and privacy to
Alaskans, Alaska is only one of eleven states30 with an explicit right to
privacy in its constitution.31 Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution
declares that “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.”32 Section
22 was added to the constitution by an amendment in 1972 in response to
the development of a computerized database of information on the
criminal history of individuals.33 The legislature feared that such a system
would result in privacy intrusions reminiscent of a “Big Brother”
government surveillance regime leading to the constitutional
25. Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and Personal
Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
29. Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 25, at 1.
30. The other ten states that have explicit rights to privacy in their
constitutions are Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington. Privacy Protections
in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx.
31. Id.
32. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22.
33. HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38. In 1971, the FBI implemented a
computerized system called the Computerized Criminal History (“CCH”)
Program. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 49 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/CCHUSE.PDF. The CCH held the full criminal history records
for both federal offenders and state offenders from participating states. Id.
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amendment’s proposal and ratification.34
Although the legislative history specifically reflects concerns about
the government controlling vast amounts of data on individuals, it also
suggests a broader concern about large amounts of data in the hands of
powerful entities. It is unlikely that the legislators at the time of the 1972
amendment could have imagined the situation of today—private
companies collecting, controlling, using, and selling data as personal as
geolocational or medical information. However, the language of the
amendment itself depicts a remarkable level of foresight, explicitly
directing the Alaska legislature—the most flexible and representative
branch of government—to pass legislation to protect Alaska citizens’
privacy.35
Despite the Alaska Constitution’s explicit call for the legislature to
implement the right to privacy, the legislature has been reluctant to act
within the data privacy sphere.36 Only one law exists that even
tangentially addresses data privacy: the Personal Information Protection
Act,37 which specifically pertains to data breaches.38 However, the law
provides no guidance on how private companies should collect, store,
use, or protect consumer data; it simply requires companies to notify
consumers of a breach.39 Due to the legislature’s inaction, the Alaska
Supreme Court has largely carried out the implementation, development,
and protection of this right.
B. Limitations on the Court’s Powers to Regulate Privacy Violations
State courts may interpret state constitutional provisions
independent of federal law when those provisions lack a federal
constitutional equivalent, such as Alaska’s explicit right to privacy.40 The
34. HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38. The delegates to the constitutional
convention sixteen years earlier were also concerned about technological
intrusion into the lines of ordinary citizens’ lives; however, that fear was limited
to wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Id. The delegates considered, but
ultimately rejected, including the following language in the constitution’s
unreasonable searches and seizures section: “The right of privacy of the
individual shall not be invaded by use of any electronic or other scientific
transmitting, listening or sound recording device for the purpose of gathering
incriminating evidence. Evidence so obtained shall not be admissible in judicial
or legislative hearings.” Id.
35. See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (“The legislature shall implement this
section.”).
36. See infra Section III.A.
37. Personal Information Protection Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010–995
(2018).
38. See generally id.
39. See generally id.
40. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Eighteenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law:
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Alaska Supreme Court has done precisely that, and has as a consequence
expanded Alaska citizens’ privacy rights beyond those of citizens
elsewhere in the United States. The court has stated:
Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on
individual liberty, enacted an amendment to the Alaska
Constitution expressly providing for a right to privacy not found
in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that
the right is broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.41
Reflecting this willingness to expand Alaskans’ right to privacy
beyond the federally recognized right to privacy, the court has recognized
that medical marijuana users have an interest in keeping their usage and
medical condition private;42 that police officers have legitimate
expectations of privacy regarding their personnel files;43 that a statute
requiring a person who places a political advertisement in a newspaper
“reveal his name, address, occupation, employer, and the amount of his
expenditure” burdens his right to privacy;44 and most recently, that sex
offenders have a legitimate expectation of privacy in preventing the
widespread publication of their conviction and personal information.45
Despite touting privacy rights in the aforementioned situations, the
Alaska Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand data privacy rights
to actions perpetrated by private actors. In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling,46 the supreme court addressed whether Alaska’s constitutional
right to privacy could be applied to private actors.47 The court explicitly
refused to extend constitutional protections to private actors’ privacy
violations.48 The court noted that article I, section 22 failed to provide
guidance on how the right should be applied, and that the legislature had
not exercised its power pursuant to article I, section 22.49 The court
explained that the primary purpose of the constitutional right to privacy
is to protect “personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
Article: The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 988
(2006).
41. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494514−15 (Alaska 1975) (Boochever, J.,
concurring).
42. Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 752–53 (Alaska 2001).
43. Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990).
44. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 86 (Alaska 1980).
45. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 128 (Alaska 2019).
46. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
47. Id. The precedent set in Luedtke remains controlling. See Miller v. Safeway,
102 P.3d 282, 287–88 (Alaska 2004) (utilizing Luedtke to support the assertion that
an Alaskan’s right to privacy cannot be violated without state action).
48. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1129.
49. Id.
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intrusions by the State.”50 However, within the same analysis, the court
recognized constitutional clauses in other jurisdictions that prohibit
private action, leaving open the possibility that Alaska’s constitutional
right to privacy could be applied to private action.51 Despite
acknowledging this possibility, the court refused to extend the right to
privacy to the private actions involved in the case.52 The court explained
that the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that Alaska’s
constitutional right to privacy was intended to apply to private actors.53
Thus, the precedent set in Luedtke and the general lack of evidence
regarding the constitutional amendment’s drafters’ intent make it
unlikely that the court will protect citizens from privacy violations
perpetrated by private actors. If Alaska wants to protect its citizens from
privacy violations by private companies, then the legislature must be the
branch to act. Importantly, article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution
explicitly calls on the legislature to act. Therefore, the Alaska legislature
should draft a comprehensive privacy bill to carry out its responsibilities
by protecting its citizens’ privacy.

III. WHY THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE SHOULD PASS
COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY LEGISLATION
This Section will explain why the Alaska legislature should pass
comprehensive privacy legislation. It will first discuss how data can be
used to harm Alaska citizens. It will then describe how tort law
insufficiently protects data privacy. Next, it will describe the current
federal data privacy regime and its deficiencies. Then, it will explain the
potential benefits to companies that could result from comprehensive
federal privacy legislation.
A. The Misuse of Data Can Harm Citizens
Data is valuable because it can be used to predict and assess
behavior, to facilitate better-informed business decisions, and to increase
revenue.54 The more data a company has, the more accurate its
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1129−30.
52. Id. at 1130.
53. Id. The court further explained that “absent a history demonstrating that
the amendment was intended to proscribe private action, or a proscription of
private action in the language of the amendment itself, we decline to extend the
constitutional right to privacy to the actions of private parties.” Id.
54. See John Akred & Anjali Samani, Your Data is Worth More Than You Think,
MIT SLOAN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/your-data-isworth-more-than-you-think/.
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predictions will be.55 Thus, companies are incentivized to collect as much
data as possible on consumers.56
Consumer data can be used for benign purposes such as marketing
or improving products.57 However, the data can also be used for
discriminatory purposes, whether it be intentional or unintentional. For
example, health insurance companies can collect and use unprotected
sensitive health information to make coverage decisions by incentivizing
voluntary disclosure through reduced rates and rewards, or by
purchasing it from fitness tracking companies.58 The data collected
through these mechanisms are not protected by federal privacy laws and
can be used to predict an individual’s risk of a significant medical event.59
The results of the risk assessment will inform a company’s decision on
whether to cover that individual—unhealthy or high-risk individuals
could be denied coverage. The health insurance company that denies
coverage could then sell the individual’s data to other health insurance
companies, ensuring that the individual cannot obtain health insurance,
all because of potentially flawed predictions of medical risk unconfirmed
by a medical professional.
Another possible discriminatory use includes employers who build
algorithms to uncover statistical relationships in data sets of potential
employees.60 The use of such algorithms, though efficient, can cause
classification bias—employer reliance “on classification schemes, such as
data algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality
or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other protected
characteristics.”61 Additionally, targeted ads can be discriminatory. For

55. Sarah Littler, The Importance and Effect of Sample Size, SELECT STATISTICAL
SERVS., https://select-statistics.co.uk/blog/importance-effect-sample-size/ (last
visited Nov. 19, 2019).
56. Id.
57. Louis Columbus, Ten Ways Big Data Is Revolutionizing Marketing And Sales,
FORBES (May 9, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016/05/
09/ten-ways-big-data-is-revolutionizing-marketing-and-sales/#2f9cc0721cff.
58. In 2018, an insurance company, John Hancock, announced that all of its
policies would come with the option to let the company track your fitness through
its website or a fitness tracker like Fitbit. Christopher Ingraham, An Insurance
Company Wants You to Hand Over Your Fitbit Data so it Can Make More Money.
Should You?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/09/25/an-insurance-company-wants-you-hand-over-your-fitbitdata-so-they-can-make-more-money-should-you/. This program would come
with lower rates and rewards for meeting fitness goals, which seems great for
healthy customers. Id.
59. See infra Section III.C.
60. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 857, 865 (2017).
61. Id. at 866. Consider a company called Gild, which offers a “smart hiring
platform” to assist companies in finding “the right talent quicker.” Id. at 862.
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example, a bank could target individuals who post information online
about recently losing their job because they are considered a likely
candidate for a high-interest loan.62 These individuals are targeted
because they fall within the category of people the bank is attempting to
reach, despite the fact that the person might qualify for a much lower
rate.63
Furthermore, a company’s client list is largely protected from public
disclosure, making it difficult to hold companies accountable for the
entities to which they sell information.64 Thus, malicious actors can obtain
consumer data from legitimate businesses and use it to radicalize and
recruit individuals and to disseminate false information.65 This nefarious
use of data was exemplified through the Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election. The Internet Research Agency (IRA)—a private
organization, with ties to the Russian government—successfully engaged
in a misinformation campaign designed to cause instability and to
influence the 2016 election.66 The IRA directly engaged with tens of
millions of Americans, targeting particularly vulnerable subsections of
the population, to spark controversy and sow discord among
Americans.67
Guild’s algorithm analyzes thousands of pieces of information to calculate
“around 300 larger variables about an individual: the sites where a person hangs
out; the types of language, positive or negative, that he or she uses to describe
technology of various kinds; self-reported skills on LinkedIn; [and] the projects a
person has worked on, and for how long,” as well as traditional criteria such as
college major and education. Id.
62. White House Says Big Data Can be Used to Discriminate Against Americans,
NPR (Apr. 26, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/white-housesays-big-data-used-discriminate-americans. A person who lost his job is more
likely to fall behind on his mortgage and thus might be more willing to accept a
high-interest loan to catch up. Id.
63. Id.
64. Matthew Crane, The Limits of Transparency: Data Brokers and
Commodification, 20 NEWS MEDIA & SOC’Y 88, 94 (2018), https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1461444816657096
(“Congress
has
largely failed to compel data brokers to identify information sources and
clients.”).
65. TRUMP, supra note 10, at 12−13, 31−35 (describing how information can be
used to harm the United States and its citizens).
66. ROBERT S. MUELLER, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4 (2019), https://
www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
67. Id. Facebook’s General Counsel estimated that “roughly 29 million people
were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA’s 80,000 posts over
the two years.” Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (testimony of Colin Stretch,
General Counsel, Facebook). However, because these posts were also shared,
liked, and followed by people on Facebook, he believed that three times more
people might have been indirectly exposed to a story posted by the IRA. Id. Stretch

37.1 BUCHANAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

36

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

6/29/2020 10:12 PM

37:1

Additionally, technology has also granted non-state actors military
and political capabilities that were previously inconceivable. Specifically,
the Internet and data aggregation has greatly expanded terrorist and
radical groups’ ability to recruit.68 Today, terrorist and radical
organizations no longer aimlessly recruit on a quantitative basis.69
Instead, these groups engage in misinformation and propaganda
campaigns similar to those carried out by the Russians during the 2016
election.70 Data allows these groups to send specific messages to a target
population based on a certain set of values, preferences, and demographic
attributes.71 The Internet generally and social media specifically provides
the perfect medium to radicalize and recruit individuals.72 The Internet
provides anonymity and a degree of protection from detection that allows
individuals to exhibit behaviors and attitudes that would be unacceptable
in the physical world.73 Additionally, the Internet can act as an echo
chamber, where potential recruits are flooded with material focused on
their preferences.74 Exposure to differing viewpoints and opinions is more
difficult to encounter.75 Thus, terrorist and radical organizations can
effectively normalize radical beliefs in potential recruits by using the
Internet and data obtained from private companies.76
Due to data’s potential to facilitate discrimination and to be
weaponized against the citizenry, the Alaska legislature should pass a law
requiring private companies to reasonably protect consumer data.
Comprehensive data privacy legislation will promote better data
practices that reduce the possibility that data will be used for

estimated that approximately 126 million people might have received content
from an IRA-associated page at some point during the two-year period. Id.
68. GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, WWW.TERROR.NET: HOW MODERN
TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET 6−7 (2004); see also Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad”:
The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror, 40 STUDIES IN CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 10, 10 (2017); see also INES VON BEHR ET AL., RADICALISATION IN THE
DIGITAL ERA: THE USE OF THE INTERNET IN 15 CASES OF TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM xii
(2013),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf.
69. WEIMANN, supra note 68.
70. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE USE OF THE INERNET FOR
TERRORIST PURPOSES 3−5 (2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/
Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf.
71. Id.; WEIMANN, supra note 68; see e.g., Rudner, supra note 68, at 12.
72. See WEIMANN, supra note 68. The process entails direct contact with the
individual, but also indirect contact such as promulgating false stories that
provide a false sense of validation in the vulnerable individual. See id. at 144
(explaining how hackers can shape an individual’s viewpoint).
73. INES VON BEHR, supra note 68, at 18.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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discriminatory purposes or accessed by malicious actors.
B. Current State Tort Law Provides Insufficient Protection Against
Privacy Violations
Currently, tort law is the only remedy that Alaskans have against
private actors that violate their privacy rights. There are four privacy torts
that states generally recognize:77 (1) intrusion upon seclusion;78 (2) public
disclosure of private fact;79 (3) false light;80 and (4) misappropriation.81
Alaska, however, only recognizes two of these four torts: false light82 and
intrusion upon seclusion.83 Neither of these torts sufficiently protects
individual privacy against private companies’ misuses.84 Specifically,
false light requires that the false depiction of the plaintiff would be
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and that the plaintiff “had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.”85 The highly offensive requirement is difficult to establish in the
context of corporate use of personal data. Companies often collect, use,
and disseminate information in bits and pieces, frequently involving
relatively innocuous information that fails to be highly offensive when
each act is taken separately.86 Thus, few plaintiffs will be able to succeed
on a false light cause of action against a company’s use of their personal
data.
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is also insufficient to protect an

77. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (dividing
privacy torts into four distinct torts).
78. Intrusion upon seclusion is the “[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs.” Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove,
Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889–90 (2010).
79. Public disclosure of private fact is the “[p]ublic disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.” Id.
80. False light is “[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.” Id.
81. Misappropriation is the “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage,
of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Id.
82. See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 53, n.21 (Alaska 2007) (adopting the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS’ description of a false light claim).
83. See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1244–45 (Alaska 2007); Eli A. Meltz,
No Harm, No Foul? “Attempted” Invasion of Privacy and the Tort of Intrusion Upon
Seclusion, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3431, 3440 (2015).
84. In fact, “it is becoming increasingly clear that the common law invasion
of privacy torts [in general] will not help to contain the destruction of [data]
privacy.”84. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey
Rosen, 89 GEO. L. J. 2029, 2043 (2001).
85. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 53, n.21.
86. Richards & Solove, supra note 78, at 1919.
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individual’s data privacy.87 Intrusion upon seclusion requires an entity to
“intentionally intrude[], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.”88 Two elements
must be met for the plaintiff to succeed: (1) the plaintiff has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and (2) the defendant’s manner of intrusion was
highly offensive to a reasonable person.89 The plaintiff is unlikely to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of corporate
collection of personal data. Much of the data collected and used by private
companies originates from the public domain or is voluntarily provided
to the company in exchange for services, and courts have concluded that
the collection and use of such data does not invade a person’s privacy.90
Even if a consumer succeeds in overcoming these procedural
hurdles, the tort system in general is still flawed. First, it is difficult to
establish standing in a case alleging a privacy tort. To establish standing,
a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”91 To establish injury in
fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally
protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”92 Mere procedural violations
are insufficient to constitute an injury in fact.93 Normally, a company’s
sale or use of an individual’s personal data does not result in a provable
particularized injury.94 Thus, plaintiffs alleging a privacy violation face an
uphill battle establishing standing.

87. Id.
88. Greywolf, 151 P.3d at 1244−45.
89. Id. at 1245.
90. Richards & Solove, supra note 78, at 1919. Individuals generally do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents or information that is
voluntarily provided to and maintained by a third party because those
individuals have neither ownership nor possession of that information—
commonly known as the third-party doctrine. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743−44 (1979) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily turned over to third parties); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–
41 (1976) (holding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
bank records because they had neither ownership nor possession of the
documents).
91. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
92. Id. at 1548 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
93. Id. at 1550.
94. See Lee J. Plave & John W. Edson, First Steps in Data Privacy Cases: Article
III Standing, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 485, 489 (2018) (“In many data breach lawsuits,
plaintiffs who have had their personal data compromised are unable to prove that
they are actually the victim of fraud or have suffered any tangible economic loss.
Instead, these plaintiffs generally argue that, because of the data beach, they are
at a greater risk of future identity theft or other harm.”).
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Additionally, the action of filing suit will likely bring more attention
to an already sensitive issue. An individual will have to relive the
embarrassment of the initial privacy invasion by discussing it in a public
hearing and having the information entered into public record.95 Finally,
it is extremely difficult to recover substantial monetary damages from
privacy tort lawsuits, shifting a plaintiff’s cost-benefit analysis further
away from filing suit in the first place.96 Thus, the privacy tort system
inadequately addresses the modern privacy problems associated with the
collection, use, and dissemination of consumer data.
C. The Lack of Federal Legislation Protecting Personal Data Generally
Comprehensive federal data protection regulation does not exist.
Instead of passing a federal comprehensive privacy law that regulates the
collection, processing, and use of data by all private companies, Congress
has passed a multitude of sectoral legislation that regulates businesses
operating within specific industries.97 These laws include the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA),98 the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),99 the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),100 the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA),101 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).102
These sectoral laws are limited in applicability. For example, FCRA
protections are limited to the disclosure of information that is collected
for the purpose of establishing credit, employment, or insurance
eligibility. 103 RFPA only protects against the disclosure of consumer
financial records to other private companies or to the government.104
95. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 506
(2010).
96. See id. at 505 (noting that courts have been reluctant to compensate
plaintiffs for nonmonetary harms resulting from violations of privacy).
97. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Security Law: What Korean Companies Need
to Know, PAUL HASTINGS, http://www.paulhastings.com/area/privacy-andcybersecurity/privacy-and-security-law-what-korean-companies-need-to-know
(last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
98. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (Oct. 26, 1970) (codified as amended at 15
USC §§ 1681-1681t (2018).
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2018).
100. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C. (2018))
101. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2018)).
102. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C. (2018)).
103. James X. Dempsey and Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2004).
104. Id. at 1478. In 2003, RFPA was expanded to include all records of specified
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Furthermore, the GLBA’s privacy provision applies only to financial
institutions,105 while COPPA only applies to a website that knowingly
collects, uses, or discloses personal information on children under
thirteen.106 Finally, although HIPAA provides strong protections,107 it
only applies to personally identifiable health information held by a
covered entity.108 Covered entities are narrowly defined, including only
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who
electronically transmit health information in connection with a
transaction.109
In addition to the aforementioned sectoral laws, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has broadly interpreted its power to regulate
“unfair”110 and “deceptive”111 trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC
Act to patrol data privacy violations.112 Despite having the broadest
businesses, such as real estate agents, jewelers, car dealers, pawnshops, and travel
agencies. Id.; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND 19
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf (providing background
information on the Right to Financial Privacy Act).
105. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE PRIVACY OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL INFORMATION RULE OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 2 (2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus67-howcomply-privacy-consumer-financial-information-rule-gramm-leach-blileyact.pdf.
106. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2018)); Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/
guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions#General%20Questions
(last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
107. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/
formsandpubs/laws/hipaa/Pages/1.00WhatisHIPAA.aspx (last visited Dec. 10,
2019).
108. HIPAA Privacy Rule: Information for Researchers, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/
pr_06.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
109. Id.
110. Unfair methods are defined as acts or practices that (1) cause or are likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers that (2) are not reasonably avoidable by
consumers, and (3) the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018).
111. Deceptive acts or practices are defined as (1) material statements or
omissions that (2) are likely to mislead consumers (3) acting reasonably under the
circumstances. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm., to
Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. On Energy and Commerce 1–2 (October
14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.
112. Section 5 of the FTC Act states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018).
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power to regulate privacy violations across sectors, the FTC currently
lacks the resources and authority necessary to adequately protect
consumer privacy.113
As highlighted above, these laws do not cover most personal data
that private companies collect, including shopping habits, religious
affiliation, sexual preferences, locational data, sensitive health
information, personal relationships, and other metadata.114 Therefore,
until the federal government passes a comprehensive privacy regulation,
the responsibility for protecting most consumer data falls on the states,
meaning that it is the Alaska legislature’s responsibility to protect its
citizens’ data.
D. Potential Benefits to Companies Created By Comprehensive
Privacy Law
A common argument against comprehensive privacy legislation is
that the increased regulation will stifle innovation.115 However, not all
innovation should be encouraged, at least not without appropriate
regulation and oversight. Innovation must be balanced against the
potential harm it might cause. Innovation at the expense of safety and
morality is generally deemed socially unacceptable. For example, twentytwo states and the District of Columbia have passed laws limiting the use
of autonomous vehicles, citing concerns about safety.116 These states have
113. The FTC does not have the ability to issue outright fines for unfair or
deceptive trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (explaining the FTC’s
remedial powers). Instead, it may only challenge these practices by initiating
administrative adjudications. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY (2019). The FTC’s power to issue legislative, legally
binding rules is extremely limited due to the overly burdensome rulemaking
process that is required. Beth DeSimone & Amy Mudge, Is Congress Putting the
FTC on Steroids?, SELLERBEWARE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010), http://
www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/04/is-congress-putting-the-ftcon-steroids.html; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL § 7.2.3.1 (1971)
(“Section 202(a) of Magnuson-Moss provides that the Commission’s § 18
authority is its only authority to promulgate rules respecting unfair or deceptive
acts or practices.”).
114. CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 73. Metadata is internet/telephonic addresses
and routing instructions that identify the recipient and the sender of various
materials over the internet or telephone. Id.
115. See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL
DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY
FRAMEWORK 29 (2010), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf (noting that commenters on the Privacy
and Innovation Notice of Inquiry expressed concerns that national legislation
would stifle innovation).
116. Jack Karsten & Darrell West, The State of Self-Driving Car Laws Across the
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determined that the risks posed by autonomous vehicles warrant
increased regulation, despite the fact that this regulation will increase the
cost to autonomous-vehicle-producing companies.117 Another example is
that most countries around the world have banned human reproductive
cloning.118 These countries have determined that the potential moral and
ethical consequences that might result from human reproductive cloning
outweigh the benefits of such an innovation, at least until the proper
ethical framework can be developed to enable it.119 Thus, certain
limitations to innovation should be considered if the innovation raises
safety or moral concerns, like those associated with unregulated data
collection.120
Furthermore, increased regulation does not necessarily stifle
innovation.121 In fact, increased regulation can encourage positive
innovation by incentivizing companies to actively seek solutions to
problems that were previously ignored.122 This is because, through
regulation, companies are forced to work within specific limitations that
did not previously exist.123 For example, stringent emission standards
accelerated the pace at which the automobile industry studied
combustion, facilitating innovation in emission control and fuel
economy.124 Another more relevant example is privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs). PETs are generally “a class of technical measures
[aimed] at preserving the privacy of individuals or groups of
individuals.”125 PETs and other innovative solutions have already begun
to emerge and to gain momentum due to laws such as the GDPR and the
U.S., BROOKINGS:TECHTANK (May 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/techtank/2018/05/01/the-state-of-self-driving-car-laws-across-the-u-s/.
117. See id. (noting safety concerns associated with autonomous vehicles).
118. Cloning: Frequently Asked Questions, NPR, https://www.npr.org/news/
specials/cloning/faq_blanknav.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
119. See id. (noting ethical concerns associated with human reproductive
cloning).
120. See supra Section III.A.
121. See Roland Bastin & Georges Wantz, The General Data Protection
Regulation: Cross-Industry Innovation, 15 INSIDE MAGAZINE 51, 52–53 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/financialservices/deloitte-nl-fsi-inside-magazine-issue-15-june-2017.pdf (discussing the
promotion of innovation through the GDPR); see also Rob Atkinson & Les Garner,
Regulation as Industrial Policy: A Case Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, 1 ECON. DEV.
Q. 358, 363–371 (concluding that regulation incentivized innovation within the
automobile industry).
122. See Bastin & Wantz, supra note 121, at 53 (noting that companies will
continue to innovate with new rules in mind).
123. Id.
124. See Atkinson & Garner, supra note 121, at 364 (quoting a former Director
of Vehicle Emissions at Chrysler).
125. Johannes Heurix et al., A Taxonomy for Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 53
COMPUTERS & SECURITY 1, 1 (2015).
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CCPA.126 For example, homomorphic encryption127 schemes are
becoming more prevalent because they allow companies to analyze data
without compromising consumer privacy.128
Companies would also benefit from comprehensive privacy
legislation because such a law would increase user trust. Many consumers
recognize that companies are collecting vast amounts of data on them and
are deeply anxious about how their personal information is used and
protected.129 In fact, current public opinion polls suggest that most
Americans believe that their data is inadequately protected.130 The polls
also suggest that this lack of trust is causing consumers to provide
incomplete or inaccurate data to data collectors.131
126. See THE ROYAL SOC’Y, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN PRACTICE: THE CURRENT USE,
DEVELOPMENTAND LIMITS OF PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN DATA ANALYSIS
4 (2019), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/ projects/privacy-enhancingtechnologies/privacy-enhancing-technologies-report.pdf (noting the rise of PET).
127. Homomorphic encryption schemes enable a company to “run
computations on encrypted data without decrypting it.” Susan Miller, Privacy
Enhancing Technology for Data Analysis, GCN (June 17, 2019),
https://gcn.com/articles/2019/06/17/privacy-enhancing-technology.aspx.
128. Id.
129. See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data Designing for Transparency and
Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-datadesigning-for-transparency-and-trust (“It’s not as if consumers don’t realize that
data about them is being captured, however; 97% of the people surveyed
expressed concern that businesses and the government might misuse their data.”).
130. See, e.g., AKAMAI, CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD DATA PRIVACY SURVEY
2018,
(2018),
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/
report/akamai-research-consumer-attitudes-toward-data-privacy.pdf.
The
Akamai survey found that forty-two percent of respondents believed that web site
operators did not care about using personal data responsibly or securely. Id.
Another thirty-two percent answered “I think they mostly want to use our data
in a responsible and secure way, but they’re bad at it.” Id. Only fourteen percent
of respondents answered, “I think they’re mostly good at using our data in
responsible and secure way[s].” Id. Another survey found that “[t]wo percent of
Americans expressed trust in social networking websites or applications; six
percent trusted online retailers; and twelve percent to nineteen percent trusted
federal or state governments, e-mail providers, and cellphone carriers. At the high
end, twenty-six percent trusted health insurance companies, and thirty-nine
percent trusted banks and credit card companies.” NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE &
ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, 7–71, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/
nsb20181/assets/404/science-and-technology-public-attitudes-andunderstanding.pdf. Yet another study, conducted by the Pew Research Center,
found that “[a] majority of Americans (64%) have personally experienced a major
data breach, and relatively large shares of the public lack trust in key
institutions—especially the federal government and social media sites—to protect
their personal information.” AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND
CYBERSECURITY, (Jan.26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/
01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
131. See, e.g., Patients Holding Back Health Information Over Data Privacy Fears,
HIPAA J. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.hipaajournal.com/patients-holding-backhealth-information-over-fears-of-data-privacy-8634/.
A
consumer
poll,
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The lack of consumer trust and data quality is concerning for private
companies because trust is the cornerstone to many customer
experiences.132 Consumer trust has long been linked to customer
satisfaction—which ensures greater customer retention—positive
reviews and references, and improved financial outcomes for the
company.133 Additionally, consumer trust is more important than ever
because consumers are bombarded with options—what was once a choice
between a couple of brands is now a global mix of hundreds.134
Compliance with privacy rules could become an effective marketing tool
to distinguish one company from another.135
Furthermore, user trust promotes data quality.136 Good-quality data
is important for a myriad of reasons. First, it promotes reliable outputs by
more accurately predicting consumer behavior.137 These outputs enable
companies to better predict consumer trends and develop products that
maximize profit. Higher quality data also increases efficiency by
decreasing the amount of time spent validating and correcting inaccurate
data.138 Finally, good-quality data allows companies to better market their
products through more accurate targeting and communication.139
Due to the importance of data quality and consumer trust,
companies should prioritize measures that will increase both. States can
completed by Black Book in 2016, found that eighty-seven percent of healthcare
patients were unwilling to comprehensively share all of their health information
with their providers. Id. Eighty-nine percent of consumers who had visited a
healthcare provider in 2016 admitted to withholding some information during
their visits. Id.
132. Blake Morgan, How to Build Trust With Your Customers, FORBES (June 11,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2018/06/11/how-to-buildtrust-with-your-customers/#2f76ca411cd3.
133. Chatura Ranaweea & Jaideep Prabhu, On the Relative Importance of
Customer Satisfaction and Trust as Determinants of Customer Retention and Positive
Word of Mouth, 12 J. OF TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MKTG. 82, 89
(2003), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/palgrave.jt.5740100.pdf.
134. Vanessa Mitchell, Why Customer Trust is More Vital to Brand Survival Than
It’s Ever Been, CMO FROM IDG (June 12, 2018), https://www.cmo.com.au/
article/642102/why-customer-trust-more-vital-brand-survival-than-it-everbeen/.
135. Companies are already beginning to emphasize privacy as a way to
market their products to consumers. See, e.g., Mike Wuerthele, ‘Privacy. That’s
iPhone’ Ad Campaign Launches, Highlights Apple’s Stance On User Protection,
APPLEINSIDER (Mar. 14, 2019), https://appleinsider.com/articles/19/03/14/
privacy-thats-iphone-ad-campaign-launches-highlights-apples-stance-on-userprotection.
136. Morey et al., supra note 129.
137. Hugo Moreno, The Importance of Data Quality—Good, Bad or Ugly, FORBES
(June 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2017/06/05/theimportance-of-data-quality-good-bad-or-ugly/#299fc96010c4.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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increase user trust and data quality by adopting comprehensive privacy
legislation. Polling suggests that adopting a policy that provides
individuals with greater control over and protection of their data can
increase public trust.140 If Alaskans believe that the data they share online
will be safe, they will be more likely to provide accurate data about
themselves.141 Therefore, private companies should welcome
comprehensive data privacy legislation because its adoption could benefit
private companies.

IV. AMERICAN VALUES CHANGE THE CALCULUS: CERTAIN
ELEMENTS OF OTHER COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY LAWS ARE
LIKELY INCOMPATIBLE WITH AMERICAN VALUES
This Section will detail how the American conception of privacy is
unique and how it substantially affects any proposed privacy legislation.
The American conception of privacy focuses on privacy as liberty. The
importance of liberty is perhaps even more overt in Alaska with the state’s
naturally rugged terrain and fiercely independent residents.142 To better
understand the American, and thus Alaskan, conception of privacy this
Section will contrast the American conception with the European
conception of privacy as dignity. Then it will argue that the American
conception of privacy coupled with the prevalence of the First
Amendment would likely prevent the adoption of a provision granting
the right to be forgotten.
A. The Alaskan and American Conception of Privacy
The American conception of privacy is unique. For Americans,
privacy focuses on protecting liberty.143 The focus on liberty is perhaps
even more distinct in Alaska, “the home of people who prize their
individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in
order to achieve a measure of control over their own lifestyles which is

140. See, e.g., Abigail Geiger, How Americans Have Viewed Government
Surveillance and Privacy Since Snowden Leaks, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACTTANK (June
4, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/04/how-americanshave-viewed-government-surveillance-and-privacy-since-snowden-leaks/. The
Pew Research Center Survey conducted in 2015 found that ninety-three percent
of Americans found it important to be in control of who can get information about
them. Id. It also found that ninety percent of Americans also believed that
controlling what information is collected about them is important. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
143. James Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
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now virtually unattainable in many [other] states.”144 Privacy as liberty is
best understood as the right to be free from unwanted government
intrusions into private spaces, especially into one’s home.145 Liberty has
evolved beyond spatial bounds to also protect freedom of belief, thought,
and expression.146 Yet American privacy law, however construed, still
“tends to imagine the home as the primary defense, and the state as the
primary enemy.”147 Generally, where American law recognizes a privacy
violation, it is precisely because the government has involved itself in the
matter.148 Thus, the less involved the government is in an alleged privacy
violation and the further it is from one’s home, the less likely the violation
will be recognized.149
To better understand the American and Alaskan conception of
privacy, it is helpful to contrast it with the European Union’s conception
of privacy. Whereas the American notion of privacy focuses on privacy as
liberty, the European conception centers on privacy as dignity.150 The
Europeans’ conception of privacy as dignity is best understood as the
“right to one’s image, name, and reputation.”151 What matters to
Europeans is the right to control their public image. European privacy
law, specifically the right to be forgotten, has developed to protect a kind
of personhood where every person, no matter his or her social status, has
the right to a respectable public image.152
Additionally, the United States Constitution does not provide an
explicit right to privacy.153 Federal privacy rights have thus been implied
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.154 This
144. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
145. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education
Privacy as Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 572 (2004).
146. Id. The freedoms of thought, belief, and expression are encompassed in
the First Amendment. Section IV.B infra describes how the First Amendment has
influenced the development of American privacy law.
147. Whitman, supra note 143, at 1215.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1194–95 (explaining how privacy protections are significantly
more limited outside the home).
150. Id. at 1161.
151. Id. at 1167.
152. Id. at 1211 (“[Dignity is defined as a] certain kind of personhood: a kind
of personhood founded in the commitment to a society in which every person, of
every social station, has the right to put on a respectable public face.”).
153. Compare U.S. CONST. with Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326), ch. II, art. 8; see also Ryan Moshell, And Then There Was
One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward
Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 373 (2005) (describing the
lack of an explicit right to privacy in the United States).
154. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to
privacy through the penumbras of enumerated rights in the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
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approach is inherently limiting because rights explicitly recognized by the
United States Constitution will always supersede privacy rights.
Although the Alaska Constitution recognizes an explicit right to privacy,
these rights must not conflict with rights expressly recognized by the
Federal Constitution.155 Therefore, even if the Alaska legislature passed
legislation that was consistent with the Alaska Constitution, the law could
be struck down federally if it is considered inconsistent with the Federal
Constitution.
B. The Right to Be Forgotten
Any proposed law should exclude the right to be forgotten. The right
to be forgotten, a uniquely European concept arising from the European
conception of privacy as dignity,156 enables a consumer to request that a
business delete all data pertaining to him that is no longer necessary for a
legitimate business or legal purpose.157
The adoption of a right to be forgotten would likely be incompatible
with the First Amendment. The First Amendment generally prevents the
government from passing laws that control or limit the dissemination of
information.158 Occasionally, an individual’s privacy expectations conflict
with the dissemination of information. In conflicts between privacy
expectations and the First Amendment, the First Amendment almost
always prevails.159 The First Amendment’s dominance arises from its
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155. See U.S. CONST. art. IV (establishing that the federal constitution, and
federal law generally, take precedence over state laws and constitutions).
156. See generally Whitman, supra note 143 (discussing the differences between
the American conception of privacy and the European conception).
157. GDPR: Right to be Forgotten, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdprinfo.eu/issues/right-to-be-forgotten/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). This concept is
a key component of the GDPR. However, the concept existed long before it was
explicitly written into law. For example, in Google v. Spain, the European Court of
Justice ruled that European citizens have the right to request that companies
operating commercial search engines that gather personal information for profit,
such as Google, remove links to personal information. Opinion of Advocate
General Jääskinen, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 2013 E.C.R.
424.
158. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1050–51 (2000).
159. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1975) (holding that unless
there is a finding of malicious intent, press statements are protected under the
First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate); N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that news publications could not
be liable for libel of public officials unless there is proof of actual intent or
recklessness); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1048–49
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modern interpretation dictating that newsworthy information—
information of legitimate public interest—should be uninhibited.160 Thus,
once data about any individual has been made public, it is extremely
difficult to remove it.
Further complicating the constitutionality of the right to be forgotten
is the commercial speech doctrine161 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.162 Traditionally, the Court
has applied a more relaxed version of its First Amendment tests to
commercial speech, relying on a form of intermediate scrutiny.163 More
recently, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court determined that
corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as
natural persons or traditional press companies.164 Under this decision, the
First Amendment has expanded beyond protecting only the individual
and the media.165 Now the First Amendment protects corporations not
only when they use information to express themselves and to keep the
public informed, but also when they use data to market products.166
Even though Alaska, much like the European Union, recognizes an
explicit right to privacy, this does not permit Alaska to promote this right
(1984) (holding that a newspaper’s right to publish intimate information
outweighed Sipple’s right to keep his sexual orientation a secret because the
information became newsworthy after Sipple became a national hero for
preventing President Ford’s assassination).
160. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2005) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
270); see generally, Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and
Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017) (discussing how the press
has used the broad definition of newsworthiness to shield itself against invasion
of privacy lawsuits).
161. The commercial speech doctrine is a tricky doctrine without a concrete
definition. Kathryn E. Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center
Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591, 596 (2013).
However, if the speech “proposes a commercial transaction,” or is “related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker,” it is considered commercial speech. Id.
at 598.
162. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
163. If the court determines that the speech in question is commercial speech,
then the regulation curtailing such speech would have to directly advance the
asserted government interest, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored. Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980).
164. 558 U.S. at 365–66.
165. See id. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether.”).
166. Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or For the
Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 538–39
(2012) (noting that the Supreme Court continues to provide equal treatment to
speakers without regard to whether they are members of the press); United States
v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding that off-label promotion
of FDA-approved drugs is protected by the First Amendment).
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at the expense of the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides
broad protection of expression. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not easily
defensible under the First Amendment’s current interpretation. However,
legislation in Alaska could include a number of other privacy protections
that would sufficiently address the underlying concerns driving the right
to be forgotten. These possibilities are discussed in the following Section.

V. WHAT THIS PRIVACY LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE
This Section will discuss what the Alaska legislature should include
in its comprehensive privacy law. It will begin by arguing that any
comprehensive privacy law should be grounded in the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) privacy principles.167 It will then describe
specific elements that should be included, using the CCPA168 and the
GDPR169 for guidance.
A. Establishing a Strong Foundation: Utilization of a Commonly
Accepted Framework
The privacy legislation should be grounded in a set of broadly
applicable principles predicated on the APEC privacy principles.170 The
APEC privacy principles include broad notions such as notice, the
prevention of harm, collection limitation, use limitation, choice,
maintenance of the integrity of personal information, security safeguards,
and accountability.171 Grounding legislation in the APEC privacy
principles will provide a strong base of data protection and user control,

167. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 2015
(2017).
168. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (2019).
169. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
170. Though the Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) privacy
principles are more commonly used when discussing privacy principles, I chose
the APEC privacy principles because I found their language more appealing. The
APEC privacy principles are essentially the same as the OECD privacy principles;
however, I prefer their phrasing over the OECD privacy principles. See Andrei
Gribakov, Cross-Border Privacy Rules in Asia: An Overview, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cross-border-privacy-rules-asia-overview
(noting the similarities between the APEC privacy principles and the OECD
principles).
171. See ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, supra note 167, at 10–22 (listing the
APEC principles).
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while simultaneously providing the legislature with a sound starting
point that other nations around the world have used. Thus, the Alaska
legislature should consider utilizing the APEC privacy principles as the
foundation of any proposed legislation.
First, the Alaska law should require companies to develop data
collection and use policies and procedures that prevent data’s misuse.172
Specifically, the companies should be required to consider the risks
associated with the use of personal data and take proportionate measures
to mitigate the harm based on the likelihood and severity of harm
threatened by such use.173 The required compliance program should
compel companies to provide clear and easily accessible statements about
their data privacy policies before or at the time that personal data is
collected.174 If the statement cannot be provided before or at the time of
collection, then the company should provide it as soon as practicably
possible after collection.175 Upon completion of a risk analysis, companies
should limit collection to information that is relevant to a specific purpose
that is both lawful and fair.176
Once the data is collected, companies should limit the use of the
collected data to circumstances that fulfill the original purposes of
collection (unless the individual provides consent), to provide a service
or product requested by the consumer, or to meet a legal obligation.177
Companies should also ensure that consumer information is accurate,
complete, and up-to-date.178 Additionally, companies should implement
appropriate safeguards to minimize loss or unauthorized access, use,
modification, or disclosure of personal information.179 These safeguards
should balance the likelihood and severity of harm resulting from usage
of the personal data, the context in which the data is stored, and the data’s
sensitivity.180 The safeguards should be periodically reassessed and

172. See id. at 10 (recognizing the need to prevent the misuse of such sensitive
information).
173. Id. at 10–11.
174. See id. at 11 (noting that statements should include “a) the fact that
personal information is being collected; b) the purpose for which personal
information is collected; c) the types of persons or organizations to whom
personal information might be disclosed; d) the identity and location of the
personal information controller . . . ; e) the choices and means the personal
information controller offers individuals for limiting the use and disclosure of,
and for accessing and correcting, their personal information.”).
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 13. Notice to and consent of the individual should be provided
during collection, where appropriate. Id. at 14.
177. Id. at 14.
178. Id. at 17.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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reviewed.181
Second, the law should provide consumers with certain explicit
rights. The law should empower consumers to exercise some choice
regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of their information through
clear, prominent, accessible, and affordable mechanisms.182 Consumers
should also be able to obtain confirmation from the controller of whether
it holds personal information about them.183 Upon provision of sufficient
proof of identity, the company should provide the individual with the
requested data.184 The company should also provide consumers with the
right to correct, complete, or amend information about them.185 This
ensures that the data retained by companies on individuals is accurate
and up to date. If the company denies a request, it should provide reasons
for its denial and an opportunity for the consumer to appeal the
decision.186
Finally, the law should ensure that companies are held accountable
for compliance with the aforementioned principles. Thus, the law must
contain enforcement provisions that facilitate compliance. Companies
should also be required to exercise due diligence and take reasonable
steps, when transferring data, to ensure that the recipient sufficiently
protects personal information.187
Compliance with the APEC privacy principles will provide a solid
foundation upon which to build. These principles not only ensure an
adequate level of data protection, but also provide for some commonality
among jurisdictions that have already passed privacy regulation.188 Thus,
181. Id.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id. at 17–18.
184. Id. at 18. The requested data should be provided at a non-excessive
charge, in a reasonable manner, and in a generally understandable form. Id.
185. Id. These right should be provided so long as compliance with such
request is not unreasonable or disproportionate to the individual’s privacy risk.
Id.
186. Id. at 19.
187. Id. at 22.
188. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 169; Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Lei No. 13,
709, de Agosto 14, 2018, Aug. 15, 2018 (Braz.) [hereinafter LGPD]; Kojin Joho No
Hogo Ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Information], Law
No. 57 of 2003 (Japan), translated in Amended Act on the Protection of Personal
Information (Tentative Translation), Pers. Info. Protection Commission (Dec.
2016) [hereinafter APPI], https://www.ppc.go.jp/files/pdf/Act_on_the_
Protection_of_Personal_Information.pdf. Though the GDPR, the LGPD, and the
APPI have their differences, at their core they are founded on the same principles
as the GDPR—the OECD privacy principles. See Kensaku Takase, GDPR Matchup:
Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information, IAPP (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-japans-act-on-the-protection-ofpersonal-information/ (noting the similarities between the GDPR and the APPI);
What is the LGPD? Brazil’s Version of the GDPR, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/gdpr-
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Alaska’s legislature should consider grounding any privacy legislation in
these principles.
B. Incentivizing Compliance Through Strong Penalties
The Alaska legislature should include significant penalties for
noncompliance in its privacy legislation. In this context, significant means
reasonably calculated to effectively influence a business’s decisionmaking calculus, without being excessive. A significant penalty will
ensure that the businesses are not simply deciding that the fine for
violating the legislation is more favorable than not collecting, using, or
selling a consumer’s data. The actual or threatened imposition of
sanctions can deter corporate wrongdoing. Because corporate activity is
generally undertaken to achieve some economic benefit, corporate
executives normally make business decisions based on calculations of
potential economic costs and benefits.189 Therefore, high economic
penalties for non-compliance could be effective in deterring companies
from violating the law.
Both California and the European Union have crafted legislation
with significant penalty provisions. The Alaska legislature should look to
these models when crafting its own penalty structure. The GDPR has the
most extensive penalty structure, providing both a private right of action
and hefty administrative fines for any violation of rights explicitly
provided by the GDPR.190 Therefore, a company might be liable for
paying both administrative fines and civil damages for the same
violation. The CCPA, on the other hand, has far weaker penalties for
violations. Under the CCPA, no administrative agency has the power to
impose administrative fines.191 Furthermore, it only provides a private
right of action under a narrow scope of circumstances: for example, when
a company fails to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures.192
The Alaska legislature should consider adopting a position that lies
somewhere between these two approaches. Instead of adopting a private
right of action for all violations of the law, the Alaska legislature should
vs-lgpd/ (last visited May 29, 2020) (noting the similarities between the GDPR
and LGPD). The APEC privacy principles are derivative of the OECD privacy
principles. Gribakov, supra note 170. Thus, grounding Alaska’s privacy law in the
APEC privacy principles will reduce compliance costs by ensuring core
similarities with other international privacy regimes.
189. Charles R. Nesson, Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (1979).
190. GDPR supra note 169, at art. 79, 83.
191. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (2019).
192. Id. § 1798.150.
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include a private right of action for violations of reasonable security
practices, similar to what exists under the CCPA. Unlike the CCPA, the
Alaska law should grant an administrative agency the authority to issue
fines for any violation of Alaska’s privacy legislation. This approach
should incentivize compliance without being overly burdensome by
forcing companies to pay administrative fines and litigation expenses for
the same violation. Citizens will be incentivized to hold companies
accountable for data breaches resulting from poor data protection
policies, while an administrative body will be responsible for enforcing
all other violations of the act. An additional benefit of the bifurcation of
responsibility is that it will reduce the future administrative agency’s
budgetary needs. Instead of having to enforce all areas of the law, it will
only need to focus on enforcing violations not covered under data breach
litigation.
C. Financial Incentives
Another provision that the legislature should consider borrowing
from existing privacy legislation is the CCPA’s financial incentives
provision. The CCPA provides that “[a] business may offer financial
incentives . . . for the collection of personal information, the sale of
personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”193
Financial incentives have proven successful in increasing and
maintaining participation in other areas and could prove useful in
encouraging consumers to part with their data.
For example, financial incentives have been shown to increase
participation in physical activity promotion programs utilizing activity
trackers.194 Financial incentives, such as profit sharing, project and
scheduled bonuses, and stock options and warrants have also been
effective in motivating higher levels of performance and productivity in
employees.195 Therefore, the adoption of a provision permitting private
entities to offer financial incentives for the collection, sale, or disclosure

193. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1).
194. See Jan-Niklas Kramer et al., A Cluster-Randomized Trial on Small Incentives
to Promote Physical Activity, 56 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. e45, e48 (2019) (noting
that the personal financial incentive group had 5.94% participation, while the
control group had 3.23% participation).
195. Adam Grant & Jitendra Singh, The Problem with Financial Incentives—and
What
to
Do
About
It,
U. PA.
(Mar.
30,
2011),
https://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-problem-with-financial-incentivesand-what-to-do-about-it/; see also ANDREW BALLENTINE ET AL., THE ROLE OF
MONETARY AND NONMONETARY INCENTIVES IN THE WORKPLACE AS INFLUENCED BY
CAREER STAGE 1–2 (2019), https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/HR/HR01600.pdf
(discussing the value of monetary and nonmonetary incentives).
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of personal information could have similarly positive results of increasing
voluntary participation.
D. Miscellaneous Practical Considerations
Other important aspects that should be incorporated into the
legislation include practical provisions that will maximize its positive
impact. The legislation should include a public policy exemption
provision, a provision that encourages the designated supervisory
authority to work with companies to achieve compliance, and a provision
that limits the scope of the law.
The legislation should include a public policy exception that enables
companies to more freely collect, use, store, and disclose information if it
is necessary for research purposes, public health reasons, or for the
completion of a government contract.196 Scientific research and public
welfare are of vital importance to society and should be appropriately
balanced with privacy concerns. Furthermore, the government has
become increasingly dependent on private contractors; thus, the bill
should not prevent the government from functioning properly.197
Therefore, a public policy exemption would ensure that the legislation
does not unduly obstruct government operations, hinder scientific and
historical research, or harm public health.
Additionally, the legislation should include a provision that
encourages the designated supervisory authority to work with companies
to understand and become compliant with its provisions. It should be
clear that the supervisory authority’s mission is not to mercilessly punish
violators. Instead, the regulatory authority should understand its duty to
help, guide, and inform companies about the legislation and upcoming
regulatory developments, utilizing reasonable fines only as a last resort.
Including this provision will make the supervisory authority’s objective
clear. It would also calm businesses’ fear that the supervisory authority
will seek only to punish violators without providing sufficient guidance.
Finally, the legislation should be limited to larger companies. The
Alaska legislature should consider adopting a provision similar to that
included within the CCPA that limits the scope of the CCPA. Similar to
the CCPA, the Alaska law should be limited to companies that do

196. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 169; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199
(2019).
197. See Steven L. Schooner & Danieal S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on
Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. CONT. MGMT. 9, 10–
12 (2008) (explaining the federal government’s increased reliance on contract
workers).
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business in Alaska and collect consumer personal information.198 It
should also consider adopting a requirement similar to the CCPA that
requires a company to satisfy one of the following before being covered
by the law: the company (1) has over $25 million in annual gross revenue;
(2) collects, processes, or sells the consumer information of 50,000 or more
Alaska residents; or (3) derives fifty percent or more of its annual revenue
from selling personal data.199 Limiting the scope of the law in such a way
will enable small companies to form and grow without being prematurely
crushed by overly burdensome regulations.

VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Alaska Constitution explicitly protects the privacy rights
of its citizens and instructs the legislature to implement these rights,
Alaska’s legislature should adopt comprehensive privacy legislation. This
legislation would protect Alaska citizens from privacy violations
perpetrated by private actors. Comprehensive privacy legislation is
necessary because current state law provides insufficient protection and
federal comprehensive privacy legislation does not exist. In order for the
legislation to be effective, it should be based in the APEC principles,
create a strong enforcement regime, offer financial incentives, consider
public policy implications, and encourage a regulatory environment that
is focused on working with the private sector to increase compliance
rather than simply punish violators. Finally, the legislature should
consider cultural norms and values while crafting the legislation. If
comprehensive privacy legislation is correctly drafted, it would promote
Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy by protecting its citizens from
perhaps the most frequent perpetrators of privacy violations—private
entities.

198. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140.
199. See id.

